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Information sharing about borrowers’ characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects on credit 
markets activity. First, it improves the banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics and permits a more 
accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it reduces the informational rents that banks could 
otherwise extract from their customers. Third, it can operate as a borrower discipline device. Finally, it 
eliminates borrowers’ incentive to become over-indebted by drawing credit simultaneously from many banks 
without any of them realizing. This chapter provides a brief account of models that capture these four effects of 
information sharing on credit market performance, as well as of the growing body of empirical studies that have 
attempted to investigate the various dimensions and effects of credit reporting activity. Understanding the effects 
of information sharing also helps to shed light on some key issues in the design of a credit information system, 
such as the relationship between public and private mechanisms, the dosage between black and white 
information sharing, and the “memory” of the system. Merging the insights from theoretical models with the 
lessons of experience, one can avoid serious pitfalls in the design of credit information systems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many countries, lenders routinely share information on the creditworthiness of their 
borrowers. This can happen either on a voluntary basis through credit bureaus, which are set 
up by the lenders themselves or operated independently by a third party, or on a mandatory 
basis, through public credit registers (PCRs) operated by central banks. 
Private credit bureaus receive data about borrowers from the respective lenders. They 
collate this information with data from other sources (courts, public registers, tax authorities, 
etc.) and compile a file on each borrower. Lenders can obtain a return flow of consolidated 
data about a credit applicant by requesting a “credit report” from the bureau. 
Lenders who provide their private information to credit bureaus are granted access to 
the common database insofar as the data provided are timely and accurate. Credit bureaus are 
exposed to a potential conflict of interest, especially when they are owned by the lenders 
themselves: each lender would like to exploit the information provided by other lenders 
without disclosing his own. This explains why sanctions are invariably threatened to any 
credit granter who fails to supply data or provides inaccurate information. Sanctions range 
from fines to loss of membership and hence denial of access to the bureau’s files. In other 
words, credit bureaus are based on the principle of reciprocity, which is generally stated in the 
contractual agreement between the bureau and credit grantors. 
A private credit bureau can issue several kinds of credit reports, depending on the 
information gathered, the type of credit application (consumer credit, house mortgage, 
business loan, etc.) and, most importantly, the amount of detail requested by the lender. 
Reports range from simple statements of past defaults or arrears − “negative” data − to 
detailed reports on the applicant's assets and liabilities, guarantees, debt maturity structure, 
pattern of repayments, employment and family history − “positive” data. The more 
sophisticated credit bureaus also use statistical models to produce and sell “credit scoring” 
services, by which they rate borrowers according to their characteristics and credit history. 
Such scores were initially developed by credit grantors mainly for assessing credit 
applications. Where positive information is also available, the models are now intensively 
also used to promote financial instruments, price loans, and set and manage credit limits. 
In several countries, government authorities have taken an active role in fostering the 
exchange of information among lenders, creating public credit registers (PCRs), which  8
operate in many respects like credit bureaus. The PCRs are generally managed by central 
banks, and access is granted only to authorized central bank staff (mainly for surveillance 
reasons and under tight confidentiality rules) and to the reporting financial institutions. This 
creates a two-way flow of data between credit grantors and the PCR, as in the case of private 
credit bureaus. 
The key difference is that participation in a PCR is compulsory, and its rules are not 
contracted, but imposed by regulation. This implies a second important difference, namely 
that PCRs have universal coverage (all loans above a threshold amount must be reported at 
specified intervals), but the information consists mainly of credit data and is disseminated in 
consolidated form (giving the total loan exposure of each borrower, but no details on 
individual loans). Credit bureaus are less complete in their coverage but offer details on 
individual loans and merge credit information with other data. 
The reporting threshold of PCRs varies considerably. Clearly, the higher the threshold, 
the fewer the number of borrowers covered and credit reports issued. The threshold also 
demarcates the segment in which private credit bureaus operate without competition from the 
PCR: above the threshold, credit bureaus have to take into account that lenders can also turn 
to the public register’s reports. The data reported by PCRs also varies considerably across 
countries. For instance, in Argentina lenders are required to report data on defaults, arrears, 
loan exposure, interest rates and guarantees. In Germany, only loan exposure and guarantees 
are reported; in Belgium, only defaults and arrears. 
Given the lack of official statistics that exists on credit bureaus and PCRs, the only 
cross-country information is based on specially designed surveys. Two such surveys have 
been carried out in recent years. The first was conducted by Jappelli and Pagano (2002) on a 
sample of 49 countries, and concerns both private credit bureaus as well as PCRs. The second, 
a large-scale World Bank project described in Miller (2003), assembled data for 77 countries, 
with extremely detailed statistics on the operation of PCRs. 
Both surveys document the impressive growth and international diffusion of 
information sharing among lenders. Figure 1 shows the fraction of countries in which either a 
PCR or a private credit bureau operated in each decade, based on data drawn from Jappelli 
and Pagano (2002) for private credit bureaus and from Miller (2003) for PCRs. Less than 20 
percent of the countries featured a private credit bureau before 1950 and less than 5 percent 
had a PCR. By contrast, by the turn of the century 50 percent of the countries surveyed by  9
Miller (2003) had a PCRs and over 60 percent of the countries surveyed by Jappelli and 
Pagano (2002) had a private credit bureau. 
This impressive overall growth in credit reporting activity, fostered both by market 
forces and regulatory intervention alike, hides considerable heterogeneity in the operating 
rules, data collected and feedback to financial intermediaries. The surveys just mentioned 
provide detailed information on several of these dimensions. 
The spread of information sharing in credit markets begs important positive and 
normative questions: what is the effect of information sharing on credit market performance? 
Why and under which circumstances lenders are willing to share private credit data? Should 
the government intervene in this activity and how? If it does, how should the rules of a PCR 
be designed? Do special issues arise in the case of developing countries, where informal 
credit is widespread?  
 
 
2. The role of credit information systems 
 
In this section, we elucidate the various roles that information sharing can have in credit 
markets, bring out the predictions that can be drawn from models which have formalized 
them, and compare these predictions with the available evidence. We then turn to examine the 
empirical evidence, bringing it to bear on the theories’ predictions. 
 
2.1. Theoretical issues and empirical predictions 
In principle, exchanging information about borrowers can have four effects: (i) improve 
banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics, easing adverse selection problems; (ii) reduce 
the “informational rents” that banks could otherwise extract from their customers; (iii) act as a 
borrower discipline device, by cutting insolvent debtors off from credit; (iv) eliminate or 
reduce the borrowers’ incentive to become “over-indebted” by drawing credit simultaneously 
from many banks without any of them realizing.  
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that information sharing reduces adverse selection by 
improving the pool of borrowers. In their model, each bank has private information about  10
local credit applicants but has no information about non-local credit applicants. The latter 
therefore face adverse selection. However, if banks exchange their information about their 
clients’ quality, they can assess also the quality of non-local credit seekers, and lend to them 
as safely as they do with local clients.
1 As a result, the default rate decreases. In contrast, the 
effect on lending is ambiguous, because when banks exchange information about borrowers’ 
types, the implied increase in lending to safe borrowers may fail to compensate for the 
reduction in lending to risky types. Banking competition strengthens the positive effect of 
information sharing on lending: when credit markets are contestable, information sharing 
reduces informational rents and increases banking competition, which in turn leads to greater 
lending. 
The exchange of information between banks may also reduce the informational rents 
that banks can extract from their clients within lending relationships, as shown by Padilla and 
Pagano (1997) in the context of a two-period model where banks have private information 
about their borrowers. This informational advantage confers to banks some market power 
over their customers, and generates a hold-up problem: anticipating that banks will charge 
predatory rates in the future, borrowers exert low effort to perform, resulting in high default 
and interest rates, and possibly market collapse. If they commit themselves to exchange 
information about borrowers’ types, however, banks restrain their own future ability to extract 
informational rents, leaving a larger portion of the surplus to entrepreneurs. As a result, these 
will invest greater effort in their project, resulting in a lower default probability, lower interest 
rates and greater lending relative to the regime without information sharing.
2 
An effect on incentives exists even when there is no hold-up problem, if banks 
communicate to each other data about past defaults, rather than information about borrowers’ 
quality. Padilla and Pagano (2000) show that this creates a disciplinary effect. When banks 
share default information, default becomes a signal of bad quality for outside banks and 
                                                 
1 Kalberg and Udell (2003) also point out that information exchange from multiple sources 
improves the precision of the signal about the quality of the borrower. 
2 Gehrig and Stenbacka (2005) consider a similar model but assume that banks compete ex 
ante for clients and that that customers face switching costs. Under these assumptions, future 
informational rents are a stimulus to competition. Since information sharing reduces these 
rents, in their model it reduces competition, in contrast with what is predicted by Padilla and 
Pagano (1997). This shows that under some assumptions, information sharing can act as an 
anti-competitive device, a point that we shall return to in Section 3. 
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carries the penalty of higher interest rates. To avoid this penalty, borrowers exert more effort, 
leading to lower default and interest rates and to more lending.
3 In contrast with the result of 
Padilla and Pagano (1997), disclosing information about borrowers’ quality has no effect on 
default or interest rates in this model. Ex-ante competition is assumed to eliminate the 
informational rents of banks, so that their customers’ overall interest burden cannot be 
reduced further. As a result, when information about their quality is shared, borrowers have 
no reason to change their effort level, and equilibrium default and interest rates remain 
unchanged. And since lending to risky borrowers is a costly investment in useful quality 
information, lending can be reduced when such information is shared: banks that cannot offset 
the costs of default by low-quality borrowers by earning informational rents on future lending 
to high-quality borrowers require a higher probability of repayment to be willing to lend, and 
the credit market may collapse in situations in which it would be viable without information 
sharing. 
This suggests that communicating default data and disclosing borrowers’ characteristics 
can have quite different effects on the probability of default. The disciplinary effect arises 
only from the exchange of default information. If banks also share data on borrowers’ 
characteristics, they actually reduce the disciplinary effect of information sharing: a high-
quality borrower will not be concerned about his default being reported to outside banks if 
they are also told that he is a high-quality client. But, as discussed above, exchanging 
information about borrowers’ characteristics may reduce adverse selection or temper hold-up 
problems in credit markets, and thereby reduce default rates. 
The previous three effects arise even if households and firms apply for credit with only 
one lender at any time. Exclusive lending is a maintained assumption in all the models 
mentioned so far. But in practice credit seekers may apply for credit from several lenders at 
the same time, and this is often granted. For instance, a consumer may simultaneously draw 
on several credit cards and/or credit lines at different financial intermediaries. It also common 
among companies, especially large ones (Ongena and Smith, 1998). 
                                                 
3 In this model there is no holdup problem because initially banks have no private information 
about credit seekers, and ex ante competition dissipates any rents from information acquired 
in the lending relation.  12
Maintaining multiple lending relationships creates informational problems for lenders if 
each potential lender has no clear information about how much credit the borrower has 
already obtained or will be able to obtain from other lenders. A borrower’s default risk, from 
the viewpoint of a given lender, depends on the overall indebtedness of the borrower when his 
obligation towards that lender will mature. If this information is unavailable to the lender, 
however, the borrower has the incentive to over-borrow. To understand why, consider a 
consumer seeking credit from a credit card company and from a bank, who do not tell each 
other how much the consumer borrows from each. Assume that the probability of default is an 
increasing function of total debt. When the consumer applies for a loan from the bank, each 
additional dollar he borrows reduces the probability of repayment of the capital and interest to 
the credit card company. Thus, the consumer’s expected repayment per dollar of debt is a 
decreasing function of his total debt and he has the incentive to over-borrow. Anticipating this 
moral hazard, both lenders will ration the amount of credit supplied and/or require a higher 
interest rate, or even deny credit unless assisted by collateral or covenants restricting total 
debt.
4 This moral hazard problem disappears if the bank and the credit card company agree to 
reveal to each other the magnitude of the credit extended to the client. So, when lenders share 
information about outstanding loans they can be expected to increase the supply of lending 
and/or improve the interest rates offered to credit seekers.  
The models mentioned so far show that by exchanging different types of information, 
lenders may control different informational problems. Exchanging information about 
borrower characteristics relieves adverse selection and hold-up problems. Pooling default 
information tends to correct moral hazard problems, and its ability to do so is actually reduced 
if borrower characteristics are also disclosed. Finally, exchanging information about 
borrowers’ debt exposure removes the particular form of moral hazard deriving from 
borrowers’ ability to borrow from multiple lenders. 
Despite the variety of the informational problems considered, overall some of the 
predicted effects of information sharing are similar. All the models predict that information 
sharing (in one form or another) reduces default rates, whereas the prediction concerning its 
effect on lending is less clear-cut. However, the prediction about default is unambiguous only 
if referred to the probability of default of an individual borrower. When one considers the 
                                                 
4 A lender is not only threatened by the borrower’s prior debt commitments, but also by those  13
average default rate, composition effects may overturn the prediction. Suppose that 
information sharing gives lower-grade borrowers access to credit. Even if each borrower’s 
probability of default is reduced, the aggregate default rate may increase because the relative 
weight of lower-grade borrowers increases in the total pool. If empirical tests rely on 
aggregate measures of the default rate, this composition effect may introduce a bias against 
the models’ prediction. 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic evidence 
The predictions about the effects of information sharing are tested in Jappelli and 
Pagano (2002) on cross-country data. As shown by the regression results reported in the first 
two columns of Table 1, the breadth of credit markets is associated with information sharing. 
Total bank lending to the private sector scaled by GNP is indeed larger in countries where 
information sharing is more solidly established and extensive. This relation persists even 
controlling for other economic and institutional determinants of bank lending, such as country 
size and growth rate, and variables capturing respect for the law and protection of creditor 
rights. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show that public and private information 
sharing also mitigates credit risk, in accordance with the theory.  
The literature also sheds light on the incentives to create private and public information 
sharing arrangements. As for private credit bureaus, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that 
lenders should have a greater incentive to share information when the mobility of credit 
seekers is high. Intuitively, a society where borrowers are very mobile is one where banks 
must often assess the credit risk of non-local credit applicants, on which some other bank 
possesses private information. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that countries that feature greater 
residential mobility (such as Canada, Australia, Sweden and the U.S.) have comparatively 
extensive private credit reporting activity, as measured by the number of credit reports per 
capita. 
As for PCRs, the incentive to establish them should be stronger where similar private 
arrangements have not yet arisen, and where creditor rights are poorly protected. Table 2 
shows that indeed PCRs were more often established in countries without pre-existing private 
credit bureaus and in countries where the legal system is based on the Napoleonic code, which 
                                                                                                                                                          
that he may contract in the future, as shown by Bizer and DeMarzo (1992).  14
is associated with poorer creditor protection. In the first column, the probability of finding a 
PCR is negatively associated to the preexistence of a private credit bureau; in the second, the 
PCR’s reporting threshold is positively associated to the preexistence of private credit 
bureaus, implying that where credit bureaus already exist the PCR’s coverage is restricted to 
large loans. This indicates that not only the existence, but also the design of PCRs responds to 
the presence of credit bureaus. The association between the presence of a PCR and the legal 
origin dummies suggests that PCRs are introduced to compensate, at least partly, for the weak 
protection that the state offered to creditors’ interests, and thus to remedy heightened moral 
hazard in lending. 
 
2.3. Microeconomic evidence 
Recent studies based on individual-level data on consumers or banks have shed further 
light on several interesting effects of information sharing arrangements in credit markets. 
Contributions have been especially produced as part of two international research projects by 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank, see Pagano (2001) and 
Miller (2003). However, this work is still piecemeal: a systematic analysis of the impact of 
these arrangements on lending activity, defaults, and interest rates is still missing. 
Some papers analyze the effectiveness of credit bureaus, and generally find that credit 
reports are an important tool to assess consumer credit risk (Chandler and Parker, 1992; 
Barron and Staten, 2003). This is confirmed by Kalberg and Udell (2003), who document that 
trade credit history in Dun & Bradstreet’s reports improves default predictions relative to 
financial statements alone. Also Cowan and De Gregorio (2003) find that in Chile positive 
and negative information in credit reports contributes to predict defaults. 
This improved assessment of credit risk appears to translate into higher lending. 
Galindo and Miller (2001) find a positive relation between access to finance (debt) and an 
index of information sharing in the Worldscope database, using the firm-level sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow as a proxy of credit constraints. They find that well-performing credit 
reporting systems reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flows. Love and Mylenko 
(2003) combine firm-level data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey with 
aggregate data on private and public registers collected in Miller (2003) and find that private 
credit bureaus are associated with lower perceived financing constraints and a higher share of  15
bank financing. However, the existence of public credit registers does not have a significant 
effect on financing constraints. 
In addition, the individual country studies of the IADB and World Bank projects brim 
with interesting evidence on the effect of information sharing on specific credit markets, 
highlighting particularly its “disciplinary role”. Castelar Pinheiro and Cabral (2001) report 
that in Brazil the whole postdated check market (whose size is of the same order of magnitude 
as the stock of household credit) operates without collateral, without personal guarantees, and 
without legal sanctions of any type. Its only foundation is its information-sharing mechanism: 
a “black list” of people issuing checks without funds. This mechanism alone also explains 
why the interest rate charged by factoring companies that operate in this market is much 
lower than that charged by credit card companies. Similar evidence is reported for Chile, 
where department stores seeking to collect an unpaid loan send the relevant information both 
to a collection agency and to the main Chilean credit bureau, DICOM. Apparently, notifying 
DICOM is a very effective way of securing immediate repayment, since delinquent customers 
see their credit dry up with all the stores that they patronize.    
Moreover, the degree and sophistication of information sharing arrangements appear to 
be synchronized with those of the financial system as a whole. For instance, Costa Rica, 
which has one of the most sophisticated credit markets in the region, also has an impressive 
and keenly competing set of private credit bureaus covering the majority of the population of 
the country, with different bureaus specializing in different services. The development of 
information sharing mechanisms appears in turn to prompt lenders to move towards more 
refined screening and monitoring practices. This is witnessed by the central role that 
information-sharing systems have taken in borrower selection in Peru, especially after the 
development of a public rating register in that country. As explained by Trivelli, Alvarado and 
Galarza (2001), this has encouraged lenders to shift away from exclusive reliance on 
collateral towards information-based lending. 
  16
 
3. Issues and pitfalls in the architecture of credit information systems 
 
Under which circumstances should public policy create a credit reporting system, by 
mandating banks to disclose their private information? And if so, which information should 
be pooled and which should be kept confidential? For how long should information remain 
available in a credit reporting system? These are just some of the many policy issues that arise 
in the creation, design and regulation of information exchange in credit markets. In this 
section we take up the most salient of such issues, building on the above discussion of the 
effects of information sharing on the performance of credit markets.  
 
3.1. Relationship between private and public systems 
Information sharing arrangements are often created spontaneously by groups of lenders 
or individual entrepreneurs, in the form of credit bureaus or of rating agencies. The design of 
a public credit registry cannot disregard how much information sharing the private sector is 
already exchanging spontaneously. Clearly, the case for the introduction of a PCR is 
comparatively stronger in countries where private information sharing arrangements among 
lenders do not exist, or are primitive and limited in coverage and scope. In fact, as mentioned 
in Section 2.2, empirically the probability that a PCR is introduced is lower in countries with 
pre-existing private information-sharing arrangements. Private and public arrangements are 
substitutes in this area. 
By the same token, however, public arrangements can “crowd out” private ones. The 
introduction of a cost-effective PCR can put existing credit bureaus out of business or 
discourage the creation of new ones. In this sense, the crucial parameter in the design of a 
PCR is the minimum reporting threshold, since it effectively delimits the market segment left 
to the operation of private credit bureaus. In countries where an effective PCR operates, credit 
bureaus tend to specialize in loans to households and to small businesses, whose size is 
typically below the reporting threshold of the PCR. The higher this threshold, the larger the 
scope for private initiative in the industry. 
The substitutability between public and private information sharing arrangements,  17
however, should not be exaggerated. There are also reasons why the two sources of 
information may be complements. For instance, credit bureaus may provide a greater degree 
of detail than PCRs, may merge other types of information with banking records or may 
provide credit-scoring services to lenders. Therefore, a lender may obtain a clearer assessment 
of a credit applicant’s solvency by accessing both the relevant PCR and a credit bureau than 
by confining himself to only one of these two sources of information. 
 
3.2. Dosage of negative and positive information 
The type of data reported is another key element in the design of a credit information 
system. The simplest and most inexpensive systems are “black lists”, which contain 
information only on defaulters. These are most effective in correcting moral hazard problems 
in the credit market, owing to their disciplinary effect via reputational mechanisms.  
Intermediate systems also include reporting of loan amounts, so that lenders may form a 
more precise estimate of the total indebtedness of credit seekers. Such information helps to 
correct the moral hazard problems that may arise if loan contracts are non-exclusive, as 
explained in Section 2.1. 
The most sophisticated systems also include other forms of positive information about 
borrowers’ characteristics, such as demographic information for households and accounting 
information for firms. As explained in Section 2.1, however, in this area “more” is not always 
“better”. A system that provides much information about borrowers’ characteristics may lead 
banks to identify high-quality borrowers more easily, but by the same token such borrowers 
will be less worried to be reported as defaulters, trusting that their reputation will not be 
stained by such an event. As a result, they may exert less effort to avoid default. 
 
3.3. Memory of the system 
The number of years a credit information system “remembers” default or arrears by a 
given borrower is another important parameter in the design of a credit information system. 
More specifically, in setting the memory of the system, one has to ask two distinct but related 
questions. First, how long are default records kept? Second, are they removed after (late) 
repayment? Both of these features impinge on what we will call the “forgiveness” (or  18
forgetfulness) of the system. 
At one extreme, a system with infinite memory, where borrowers have no chance to exit 
from the “black list” even after late repayment, may create a high incentive to repay on time, 
but may ex ante deter the decision to take any debt. The risk of being eternally black listed in 
case of default may be so large as to deter from borrowing even individuals with relatively 
solid prospects. Ex post, a black list with extremely long memory may prevent defaulted 
debtors from ever making a comeback. Upon default, entrepreneurs may never have a chance 
to get new loans and start a new business, and therefore to repay their past debts. 
Furthermore, even if a borrower has the money to repay a defaulted loan, he may have little 
incentive to do so because in any event his reputation is permanently marred. In this sense, a 
black list with very long memory can contribute to the well-known problem of “debt 
overhang”, by which defaulted debt becomes a permanent obstacle to the resumption of 
subsequent economic activity. At the other extreme, a system where records are kept for a 
very short time and immediately erased upon late repayment would exert very little discipline 
on borrowers and correspondingly provide very little information on their track record to 
lenders. 
The desirable degree of memory and “forgiveness” of the system lies between these two 
extremes. The system should trade off the need to discipline borrowers and the need to give 
them a “second chance”. The optimal degree of forgiveness depends on many features of 
reality, including for example the persistence of default-inducing shocks, and generally differs 
from country to country. Where creditor rights are less well protected, for instance because of 
poor judicial enforcement, the need to discipline borrowers may be more pressing than 
elsewhere, and therefore one may want to make the memory of the system longer and less 
forgiving. 
A particularly interesting memory design is found in the Belgian Central Office for 
Credit to Private Individuals, a PCR that records only default information concerning 
household debt. Borrowers who redeem their debt disappear more quickly from the register 
than borrowers for whom a repayment commitment continues to exist. If arrears are repaid 
then the information is automatically removed after one year; if the debt is repaid after 
default, it is removed only after 2 years. Irrespective of the type and status of the obligation, 
the database does not keep any record for more than 10 years. So “punishment” is stricter for  19
more serious misconduct (defaults are punished more than arrears), but eventually there is 
forgiveness for everybody. 
Apart from its role in the design of a PCR, this parameter is also a public policy 
variable, insofar as policy-makers may limit the memory of private credit bureaus by 
regulation. For instance, Danish credit bureaus are entitled to register and distribute at most 5 
years of data that is relevant to assess the financial situation of businesses or individuals; the 
1970 U.S. Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended in 1996, prohibits dissemination of adverse 
information (such as bankruptcy) after more than 7 years. 
 
3.4. Monopolistic dangers of private information sharing 
The literature on Industrial Organization (IO) highlights that information sharing 
between firms may either increase or decrease the degree of market competition and the 
surplus enjoyed by consumers. This literature generally considers firms rather than financial 
intermediaries, and therefore typically abstracts from the effects that information sharing may 
have on adverse selection or moral hazard problems in downstream relationships with 
customers. Vives (1990) and Kuhn and Vives (1995) show that the effects of the production 
of information by an oligopolistic firm on the profits of its competitors and on consumer 
surplus are in general ambiguous, and depend on the nature of the information produced 
(aggregate demand, individual demand, production cost) and on the type of strategic variables 
chosen by competitors (price or quantity competition). 
In the context of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product and price 
competition, firms may try to collude to set prices above the competitive level and thereby 
earn extra profits. The collusive agreement is sustained by each firm’s implicit threat of 
competing aggressively in the future against any potential deviant. But such deviations from 
collusion can be punished only if detected: for collusion to be sustainable, each firm must be 
able to observe the prices set by its competitors. Therefore, sustaining collusion requires a 
certain degree of price disclosure by competitors. On this basis, in recent times competition 
authorities have often come to regard information-sharing agreements as automatic evidence 
of collusive practices (Kuhn, 2001). 
This contrasts with the literature surveyed in Section 2.1, whose general thrust is that in 
credit markets information sharing tends to increase competition, by making the information  20
set of lenders more homogeneous and thereby reducing lenders’ information rents. The main 
difference between the traditional IO standpoint and this new banking literature on 
information sharing has to do with the type of information exchanged. In the banking 
literature, lenders share information about the characteristics or behavior of their customers, 
rather than about prices, sales and costs, as assumed by the traditional IO literature.
5 
Indeed, information sharing among banks has never been a concern of competition 
authorities: governments often mandate information sharing as a way to enhance competition 
in the financial sector. This does not rule out, however, that even information-sharing 
arrangements in the financial sector may be designed to stifle competition. This can be 
achieved by setting up a credit bureau as a closed-membership “club of incumbents.” By 
refusing to admit potential entrants, incumbents erect an informational barrier to entry: 
without access to the club’s database, entrants are less informed than are incumbents. 
This is exemplified by the Mexican case, where in recent years the Mexican Bank 
Association formed a private credit bureau (“Buro de Credito”) in partnership with Duns & 
Bradstreet and Trans-union. Two attempts to set up competing credit bureaus were 
unsuccessful because it proved impossible to obtain information from the banks. This happens 
whenever banks are vertically integrated with a monopolistic credit bureau, with which they 
have an exclusive relationship. This strategy allows banks to use the bureau as a collective 
entry prevention device against potential entrants in the credit market, illustrating a potential 
danger of information sharing arrangements even in credit markets. 
This suggests that credit bureaus should be open-access, so that any actual or potential 
lender can access the same information at non-discriminatory costs. Alternatively, public 
policy should foster competition among private credit bureaus.
6 In some cases the only way to 
create sufficient competition is to set a very low - possibly zero - threshold in public credit 
registers, as indeed is the case in several Latin American countries. 
                                                 
5 Even when they share information about loans, credit bureaus do not reveal the identity of 
the lender associated with a particular loan. 
6 This may not always be possible, the strong economies of scale that characterize the 
industry, which in fact has undergone a process of dramatic concentration (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 1993).  21
 
3.5. Pooling information across company groups and countries 
If a credit information system must go beyond negative information and provide data 
about the overall indebtedness of each debtor, it must identify debtors and their liabilities 
unambiguously. For households, this is relatively simple, but it is worth mentioning that it 
may be much more difficult for firms belonging to company groups. A subsidiary may have a 
very limited debt exposure, but the group may be greatly over-indebted. In fact, a distressed 
group will want to disguise its true leverage by borrowing new funds via relatively healthy 
subsidiaries. 
Consolidating debt for company linked by complex pyramidal structures and cross-
shareholdings is very difficult, and even large PCRs may be ill-equipped to do so. The loans 
to the various subsidiaries may go undetected to a PCR because each of them does not exceed 
the reporting threshold. While this is unlikely to happen for large corporations, whose loan 
sizes are quite large anyway, in some European countries the group structure is commonplace 
even for small and medium-sized enterprises (see Barca and Becht, 2001). And corporate 
groups often transcend national borders. If a group takes large amounts of debt via its foreign 
subsidiaries, both the PCR of the country where the group’s holding company is incorporated, 
and banks, will be unable to get reliable and complete data about the company’s overall 
exposure.
7 
The problems created by access of companies to foreign credit, however, do not arise 
                                                 
7 This is exemplified by two conspicuous Italian cases, the Ferruzzi and the Parmalat 
scandals. In both cases, the huge debt buildup in the early 1990s was facilitated by an 
incomplete perception of the group’s total exposure. In 1992 the Ferruzzi group was the 
second industrial group in Italy and had a hugely complex financial structure, with an Italian 
holding company and nearly 300 controlled companies, of which only 100 registered in Italy. 
The group borrowed heavily both in Italy and abroad, via its many subsidiaries, and in 1993 it 
entered a state of financial distress. Its total indebtedness was almost US $20 billion, an 
amount that “exceeded the entire private external debt of the Philippines ($14 billion), and 
was not far from that of Malaysia ($28 billion) at the end of 1997” (Penati and Zingales, 
1998, p. 2). About one quarter of its total unsecured bank debt ($15 billion) was owed to 
foreign banks. Much of this debt had been transferred within the group from one company to 
another via a complex set of intra-group loans. A similar story appears to explain the build-up 
of debt carried out by Calisto Tanzi, the controlling shareholder of Parmalat. Although in this 
case a precise account must await the verdict of on-going trials, there is substantial evidence 
that much of the undetected debt was raised by the foreign subsidiaries of the group.  22
solely due to the possibility of borrowing via foreign subsidiaries. A multinational group 
structure compounds the problem, but even when a company borrows directly from foreign 
banks its debt may go unreported to the domestic PCR. Hence, the roots of this information 
sharing problem lie in the phenomenon of cross-border lending: not only companies, but also 
individuals (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of European national and cross-border information 
sharing regulation) increasingly access foreign credit markets via their foreign subsidiaries, 
and use such credit to diversify their sources of funds, reduce their cost of capital or overcome 
domestic credit constraints. As borrowers become integrated into the world capital market, 
national credit information systems become unable to identify their total indebtedness. 
So far, credit bureaus have adopted one of two alternative strategies to respond to this 
challenge: direct entry into foreign markets or alliances with foreign bureaus. Direct entry can 
be implemented by setting up local branches in foreign countries or by taking over national 
credit bureaus.
8 Other bureaus have created a web of transnational alliances to resist this wave 
of consolidation. Several European credit bureaus have linked up with each other in recent 
years. By creating a two-way flow of information between each other, these bureaus are 
trying to provide the same services as truly multinational entities without surrendering their 
independence. The same problems arise for PCRs. Again, a possible solution is to coordinate 
national public registers and create interfaces between their information systems. Of course, 
this may not be easy to implement. Apart from the fact that in some countries PCRs do not 
exist, the existing registers often feature different designs regarding coverage, reporting 
thresholds, and type of information reported and privacy protection clauses, posing 
formidable problems to their integration. These substantive problems are compounded by the 
inertia that is so often typical of bureaucratic organizations, which operate under a soft budget 
constraint and lack the competitive pressure under which private organizations operate. 
Does this make national PCRs obsolete organizations, bound to be displaced by the 
growth of private transitional private credit bureaus? The answer probably hinges on how 
many years ago a PCR was established. In Europe, where national PCRs are quite old and 
feature deeply ingrained differences, the seven countries that have them find it difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
8 Of course, this is unlikely be the only reason for the strategy of credit bureaus’ foreign 
acquisitions. Other reasons are economies of scale, superior technical knowledge accumulated 
by large bureaus, and desire to diversify revenue structure.  23
agree on a common set of rules, so that the danger of their displacement by private 
multinational bureaus is increasing (Jappelli and Pagano, 2003). By the same token, however, 
countries that are just establishing a public credit register for the first time have the 
opportunity of designing them so as to ensure compatibility with the systems of their main 
commercial partners. In this dimension, latecomers may be better positioned than their 
predecessors. 
 
3.6. Privacy protection 
Credit information provision finds an obvious limit in the set of legal provisions 
designed to protect confidential information, or individual privacy. Such provisions differ 
widely both within Europe and between the U.S. and European countries and these 
differences appear to have had profound effects on the development of credit information 
systems (see Chapter 2 in this volume, and Jappelli and Pagano, 2003). For instance, France’s 
strict privacy protection laws have prevented the development of private credit bureaus in that 
country. 
The degree of privacy protection accorded to prospective borrowers has historically 
affected the development of credit bureaus. The activities of credit bureaus are regulated 
almost everywhere so as to prevent violation of privacy and civil liberties. Privacy laws effect 
a wide range of consumer guarantees, such as limits on access to files by potential users, bans 
on white information (e.g., in Finland and Australia), compulsory elimination of individual 
files after a set time (e.g., 7 years in the United States, 5 in Australia), bans on gathering 
certain kinds of information (race, religion, political views, etc.) and the right to access, check 
and correct one’s own file.
9 
                                                 
9As far as access limits are concerned, there appear to be three levels of privacy protection. 
There are low-protection countries, such as Argentina, where anyone can access all debtors’ 
data regardless of the purpose of investigation. In medium-protection countries as the United 
States, data can be accessed only for an “admissible purpose”, essentially the granting of 
credit. A higher level of privacy protection may be embodied in the further requirement of the 
borrower’s explicit consent to access his file. This principle is enshrined in the legislation of 
several European countries and in the Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament on “the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data”. In some countries (such as France, Israel and Thailand) safeguards 
for consumer privacy are so strong that regulation has impeded the emergence of private 
credit bureaus.  24
However, one should not necessarily take a negative view of the effect of privacy laws 
on credit information systems. As already pointed out in our discussion of the desirable 
memory of such systems in Section 3.3, divulging certain types of information may lead 
people to become “too cautious”, that is, it may reduce risk taking and entrepreneurship below 
the socially desirable level. Therefore, a moderate concern for privacy may also indirectly 
serve economic efficiency. 
In addition, there is one privacy-protection rule that directly improves the accuracy of 
the data stored by credit information systems: entitling individuals with the right to inspect 
and correct mistaken information about them. Such feedback not only improves the quality of 
information, but also helps to correct the negative bias in reporting that credit bureaus are 
often blamed for (see also the discussion in Chapter 9). Such bias is easily explained: when a 
negative credit report is mistakenly filed, the lender will generally deny credit and therefore is 
unlikely to ever find out about the mistaken information, while the opposite would happen if a 
positive report was filed for a bad credit risk. Therefore, credit bureaus prefer to err on the 
negative side. 
 
3.7. Designing information sharing systems in developing countries 
Some issues in the design of credit information systems are particularly relevant for 
developing countries, where these systems are often still being designed. 
First, in most developing countries, the role of informal lending is much larger than in 
developed economies. Since, typically, both credit bureaus and PCRs base their information 
on data reported by formal lenders, their utility is much reduced in these countries. This 
limitation of information sharing systems could be overcome by allowing informal lenders - 
such the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that manage microcredit programs - to 
access PCRs. For instance, Trivelli, Alvarado and Galarza (2001) report that one of the main 
limitations of the Peruvian PCR is its insufficient coverage of data about debts with informal 
and rural lenders, because the majority of such lenders have never had any relation with the 
formal system. 
A second issue is that PCRs are more important in countries where creditor rights 
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receive relatively poor protection and the law is less effectively enforced, as documented in 
Section 2.1. In this sense, PCRs appear to act as a partial substitute for the lack of good 
judicial enforcement. Credit bureaus can of course play this role too. The disciplinary role of 
negative information can be particularly important in this respect. For instance, in Brazil 
information sharing mechanisms allow widespread reliance on post-dated checks. Pinheiro 
and Cabral (2001) report: “Easy, low-cost information on the person writing the check and the 
high cost to the consumer of being placed on a ‘black list’ for writing a check without funds 
have made post-dated checks the most widely used form of consumption financing” (p. 179). 
Thirdly, in LDCs the availability of information provided by PCRs can effectively 
induce changes in banks’ lending policies, shifting from a collateral-based lending policy to 
an information-based one. In many developing economies, it is often complained that formal 
lenders request their loans to be assisted by collateral whose value greatly exceeds the loan 
and pay little attention to the prospective cash flows of the project they are financing. The 
availability of more readily usable information, together with knowledge of credit scoring 
techniques, may contribute to a shift in lending strategies. 
Finally, in developing countries, credit information systems should be designed so as to 
be accessible by relatively unsophisticated bank personnel, and avoid importing too 
sophisticated systems, which presuppose very detailed positive information or rely on 
complex scoring techniques. Most LDCs may usefully start with simple negative information 
systems, possibly complemented by data on loan exposure, and later proceed to enrich them 
with additional data on corporate accounts and management and personal information. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the economic effects of information 
sharing systems, drawing together theory and empirical evidence, with an eye to obtaining 
directions for the design of credit information systems. Information sharing about borrowers’ 
characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects on credit markets activity. 
First, it improves the banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics and permits a more 
accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it reduces the informational rents 
that banks could otherwise extract from their customers. Third, it can operate as a borrower 
discipline device. Finally, it eliminates borrowers’ incentive to become “over-indebted” by 
drawing credit simultaneously from many banks without any of them realizing. This chapter 
provides a brief account of models that capture these four effects of information sharing on 
credit market performance, as well as of the growing body of empirical studies that have 
attempted to investigate the various dimensions and effects of credit reporting activity. 
One of the insights from the literature is that the design of the mechanism used to share 
credit information matter at least as much as the decision to set up an information sharing 
mechanism. The theoretical insights of the literature help to identify key issues in the design 
of credit information systems: the relationship between public and private mechanisms, the 
dosage between negative and positive information sharing, the “memory” of the system, and 
several others. This can provide guidance about possible pitfalls in the design of credit 
information systems, which are of particular relevance to developing countries, where such 
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Appendix. Definition of variables used in Tables 1 and 2 
 
Bank  Lending  Claims of banks on private sector, 1994-95 average. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (line 32d). 
 
Credit Risk  The index is based on the International Country Risk Guide Financial 
Indicator (ICRGF) and refers to October 1995. The index is constructed 
on the basis of a survey of leading international bankers, who are asked 
to rate each country on a scale of 0 to 10 each of the following 5 risks: 
default or unfavorable loan restructuring, delayed payment of suppliers’ 
credits, repudiation of contracts by governments, losses from exchange 
controls, expropriation of private investments. The original index scales 
from 0 to 50 (maximum creditworthiness). We define Credit Risk as 50 
minus the original index, so that 50 represents maximum risk. Source: 
Erb et al. (1996), Table 4, Series ICRGF. 
 
Creditor  Rights  An index aggregating creditor rights. The index aggregates various 
rights that secured creditors might have in bankruptcy, liquidation and 
reorganization. Restrictions on the managers’ ability to seek unilateral 
protection from creditors, mandatory dismissal of management in 
reorganizations, lack of automatic stay on assets, and absolute priority 
for secured creditors all contribute to this index. The index ranges from 
0 to 4. Source: La Porta et al. (1997). 
 
Log GDP  Logarithm of the gross domestic product in 1992-93. Gross Domestic 
Product is expressed in 1990 million dollars. Source: International 
Financial Statistics, line 99b for GDP and aa for exchange rates. 
 
GDP growth  Average annual percent growth of per capita gross domestic product, 
for the period 1970-1993. . Source: International Financial Statistics. 
 
Legal Origin  Identifies the legal origin (English, German, French, Scandinavian) of 
the company law or commercial code of each country. Source: La Porta 
et al. (1997). 
 
Rule of Law  Assessment of the law-and-order tradition in the country. Average of 
the 1982-95 period. Scale from 0 to 10 with lower scores for less 
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Note. The number of credit reports refers to 1989 for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France 
and Spain, to 1988 for Japan, and to 1990 for all other countries. Private consumption is drawn from the OECD 
National Accounts. Residential mobility is the household’s probability of changing residence in a year.  31
Table 1. Effect of information sharing on Bank Lending / GDP and on Credit Risk 
 
Variable  Bank Lending / GDP  Credit Risk 
 
  OLS Robust 
 
OLS Robust 


















































































Adjusted R square  0.67 
 
-.- 0.84 -.- 
Number of countries  40 
 
40 35 35 
 
Note. This table is based on Jappelli and Pagano (2003). Negative Information Only is 1 if prior to 1994 private 
credit bureaus and/or PCRs exchange black information, and 0 otherwise. Negative and Positive Information is 1 
if prior to 1994 credit bureaus or PCRs exchange black and white information. See the Appendix for sources and 
definition of the other variables. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. White-corrected standard errors are used 
in the OLS estimates. 
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Table .2. Determinants of the Presence of Public Credit Registers 
 
 
Variable Probit  Tobit 
 
























Number of countries  43  41 
 
Note. This table is based on Jappelli and Pagano (2003). Countries are divided according to the presence of 
public credit registers. Presence of a PCR is 1 if the register is operating in 1998, 0 otherwise. Pre-existence of a 
Private Credit Bureau is 1 if at least one private credit bureau was in operation before the establishment of the 
PCR, 0 otherwise. See the Appendix for sources and definition of the other variables. In the Probit regression the 
dependent variable is the presence of a PCR prior to 1998 and the coefficients indicate the effect of the variable 
on the probability of establishment of a PCR. In the Tobit regression the dependent variable is the PCR 
minimum reporting threshold. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 